Case Analysis of Regina v. Mark Royle 2013 EWCA Crim 1461

Regina v. Mark Royle [2013] EWCA Crim 1461

Facts

The case involves the appellant, who was accused of robbing and causing the death of Mrs. Geraghty, a 79 year old woman. The appellant was reportedly addicted to hard drugs and was desperate for money, which led him to cycle around Greater Manchester looking for opportunities to commit theft. On the day of Mrs. Geraghty’s death, the appellant was seen at a friend’s flat, anxious to buy drugs and in possession of fresh £20 notes, which he claimed were obtained by selling a stolen laptop.

On the morning of November 24th, the appellant was seen wearing a red jacket, bobble hat, and jeans. He was later identified in CCTV footage, which he acknowledged could be him, although he denied robbing Mrs. Geraghty. The prosecution argued that the appellant used significant force to snatch Mrs. Geraghty’s handbag, resulting in her sustaining injuries that led to her death. The injuries included a significant impact to her head, which could have been caused by kicking, stamping, or a powerful punch.

The appellant was tried and convicted of murder. During the trial, the judge directed the jury on the issue of intent, emphasizing that they must be sure the appellant intended to cause really serious harm. The appellant’s defence was a complete denial of the robbery and the assault on Mrs. Geraghty. The appellant appealed the conviction, arguing that the judge’s directions on intent were inadequate and that the jury should have been directed according to the principles established in Nedrick and Woollin, which require that death or serious bodily harm be a virtual certainty as a result of the defendant’s actions. The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding that the jury’s verdict was supported by the evidence presented.

Issues Raised

1. Whether the judge’s direction on intent were inadequate and misdirected a case of robbery to charging for murder when no clear evidence exists that victim died due to kicking or stamping by appellant?
2. Whether the appellant can be tried for murder, even though he committed robbery, in the course of which, the victim died, is there enough intention to harm to cause death?
3. Whether the satisfaction that the appellant kicked or stamped on victim is sufficient to infer intent to cause really serious harm?
4. Whether the court erred in directing the jury to apply principle of Nedrick and Woolin case?

Law

Criminal Justice Act, 1967: s.8 Proof of criminal intent.[1]

A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence,—

(a)shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions; but

(b)shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.

Criminal Justice Act 2003 – Schedule 21, Paragraph 5(1)(a) & 5(2)(c)[2]

The sentencing guidelines classify murder for gain under a 30-year starting point. The court considered this provision but reduced the minimum sentence due to mitigating factors.

Homicide Act, 1957[3]

Defines murder and manslaughter, requiring proof of intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm (GBH) for a murder conviction.

Doctrine of Oblique Intention – It is similar to Principle of Reasonable Foresignt in criminal law. It means a man intends the natural consequences of his act. It is applied when someone’s actions result in a harmful outcome that they foresee as likely to happen, when direct intention cannot be inferred.

R v. Wollin: established that murder requires foresight of death or serious bodily injury as a virtual certainty.

Analysis

Contention

Appellant

The defence argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury on intent, failing to give a Nedricka and Woollin[4] case direction, which requires proof that serious harm was a virtual certainty and that the defendant appreciated this. Since there was no direct evidence of how Mrs. Geraghty’s injuries were inflicted, they claimed the jury could not safely infer intent. They also contended that the judge’s response to the jury’s note on intent was inadequate. Additionally, they argued that the 28-year minimum sentence was excessive, as the intent to harm was formed within seconds and lacked premeditation.

Prosecution

The prosecution countered that the jury could infer intent from the force used and the victim’s injuries. They argued that a Woollin[5] direction was unnecessary because intent could be directly inferred from the brutality of the attack. The prosecution highlighted Royle’s use of significant force during the robbery, which led to Mrs. Geraghty’s injuries and subsequent death. The Crown also defended the 28-year sentence, citing Royle’s long criminal history and the aggravating factors of targeting elderly, vulnerable victim in a murder for gain             

Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed Royle’s appeal, finding that the judge’s instructions were clear and adequately addressed the issue of intent.  The court also held that by stamping on the elderly victims head it was a ‘virtual certainty’ that serious harm would be caused.

The court reasoned that the jury could safely infer intent from the circumstantial evidence, particularly given the severity of the force used during the robbery. The court also noted that lack of premeditation and the rapid formation of intent during the commission of the crime was a mitigating factor, which led to reduction in the minimum term from 28 to 25 years.

The judge emphasized the vulnerability of the victim as a significant aggravating factor, which warranted a severe sentence. They acknowledged Royle’s history of drug addiction and criminal behaviour but concluded that these factors did not diminish the seriousness of the crime.

In R v. Woollin[6] and R v. Nedrick,[7] the court established the “virtual certainty” test for inferring intent, which requires that the defendant’s actions make death or serious bodily harm a virtual certainty.

In R v. Nedrick,[8] the appellant poured paraffin over front door of house and put it alight. The fire caused death of child. The court held that the appellant has reasonable foresight of high probability that the act would result in serious bodily injury.

In Hyam v. Director of Public Prosecutions,[9] the defendant burnt down the house of her rival in love, thereby killing her children. The court held the defendant liable for murder as she knew her actions would cause serious bodily injury or death.

In R v Cunningham,[10] this case set the standard on two-fold basis – there is an intent to kill and there is an intent to cause serious injuries, but the court held that Royle’s actions were intentional, not reckless, making Cunningham inapplicable.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal upheld Mark Royle’s conviction for murder, rejecting claims of jury misdirection and confirming that intent to cause serious harm could be inferred from the attack’s brutality. However, the minimum sentence was reduced from 28 years to 25 years, recognizing the absence of premeditation and the quick formation of intent.

This ruling reinforces the principle that intent for murder can be inferred from the nature and severity of an attack, even without direct evidence of how injuries were inflicted. It clarifies the application of the Nedrick and Woollin test, affirming that such a direction is only necessary where intent is ambiguous—not in cases involving direct physical violence.

It also provided precedent for inferring intent in murder cases based on circumstantial evidence. By using oblique intention doctrine, the court affirms the principle of reasonable foresight, under which a man intends the natural consequence of his act.

[1] Criminal Justice Act 1967, c.80, § 8 (UK).

[2] Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44 (UK).

[3] Homicide Act, 1957, c. 11 (UK).

[4] R v. Woollin, 1999 1 AC 82 (1998) 3 WLR 382 (HL).

[5] Id.

[6] R v. Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82: (1998) 3 WLR 382 (HL)

[7] R v. Nedrick, (1986) 1 WLR 1025 (CA).

[8] R v. Nedrick, (1986) 1 WLR 1025 (CA).

[9] Hyam v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1975 AC 55: (1974) 2 WLR 607 (HL).

[10] R v Cunningham [1982] AC 566, (1981) 3 WLR 223 (HL).